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12.1  Introduction 
Over the past three decades, Taiwan has experienced one of  the world’s 
highest sustained economic growth rates. From 1953 to 1988, real gross na- 
tional product (GNP) grew at an average annual rate of 8.82 percent. Foreign 
trade has grown at an even faster pace. Over the same thirty-five-year period, 
for example, exports and imports increased  at average annual rates of 21.87 
percent and 19.25 percent, respectively. Consequently, the foreign sector has 
become the most important sector of Taiwan’s economy. Exports of goods and 
services have accounted for more than 50 percent of GNP since  1978. Tai- 
wan’s persistent trade surplus, which occurred during most years in the 1970s 
and  1980s, has resulted in huge international currency reserves and has be- 
come a major source of economic instability in recent years. 
A number of previous  studies have argued that foreign direct investment 
(FDI) contributed  to the  growth process  in Taiwan by  providing  funds for 
capital  formation  and  facilitating  technology  transfers.* Furthermore,  FDI 
with a high export orientation also contributed significantly to Taiwan’s trade 
Ching-huei Chang is a research fellow at Sun Yat-sen Institute for Social Sciences and Philoso- 
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1.  Taiwan’s international reserves have been at around U.S. $65 billion since 1987, ranking 
third in the world behind Japan and West Germany. Not surprisingly, Taiwan’s currency appre- 
ciated from New Taiwan (N.T.) $39.85 per U.S. dollar at the end of 1985 to N.T. $25.90 per U.S. 
dollar in June of  1989. The external imbalance not only created tensions and disputes with major 
trading partners but also generated excess liquidity and raised strong inflationary pressures in the 
domestic economy. 
2.  These conclusions have been reached mostly by qualitative analysis. For a brief review, see 
Lee and Hu (1989) and Tsai (1991). 
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surplus, which  helped  alleviate the foreign exchange shortages prevalent  in 
previous  decade^.^ 
In fact, more than 40 percent of Taiwan’s gross domestic capital formation 
(GDCF) in 1952-60  was financed by foreign capital, predominantly U.S. aid. 
However,  the importance of  foreign capital has declined  significantly  since 
the termination of U.S. aid in 1965. Although private FDI has risen steadily 
in nominal terms since then, FDI as a percentage of GDCF has dropped from 
8.03 percent in 1966-70  to 2.94 percent in 1976-80  before swinging back to 
4.39 percent in 1981-86  (R. Wu 1989). In addition, FDI in Taiwan as a per- 
centage of global FDI has remained quite stable between 0.2 and 0.5 percent 
during 1965-84  (Tsai 1991). 
In general, government  policies  have been  very  favorable toward  FDI in 
Taiwan, though  there were various forms of  government  manipulation  that 
affected the amount and direction of FDI.4  The treatment afforded foreign en- 
terprises in Taiwan has been essentially the same as that given to the corre- 
sponding types of local enterprises.  Since before  1980 Taiwan followed the 
dual development strategies of import substitution and export promotion, for- 
eign investors could enjoy all kinds of tariff and nontariff protection if  they 
produced for the domestic market.5  They could also take advantage of various 
assistance measures such as export processing zones, tax rebates, and export 
loans if they produced for international markets. 
Furthermore, since the major concern of  national tax policy has been stim- 
ulation of investment, in addition to low corporate income tax rates very gen- 
erous tax  incentives have been  provided.  The highest  marginal tax  rate on 
corporate income remained 25 percent for most of the years after 1956, with 
the exception of  1974-85.6  Major tax incentive measures,  such as tax holi- 
days and a tax ceiling, were first introduced in 1960, and accelerated deprecia- 
tion and investment tax credit were added in the 1970s and 1980s. Nowadays 
Taiwan has one of the most complex tax incentive systems in the world.’ 
Taiwan’s major economic objective in recent years, however, has been the 
establishment  of  an  international  and  more  liberalized economy.  Strategies 
adopted include  loosening  restraints  on foreign exchange control, reducing 
tariff and nontariff barriers, and opening domestic markets.s Foreign invest- 
3. Though the export ratio of foreign firms in Taiwan has declined gradually in recent years, it 
was over 50 percent before 1985. The exports of foreign firms in 1980-84 accounted for about 20 
percent of Taiwan’s total exports and caused more than 30 percent of  the trade surplus in Taiwan 
(cf. R. Wu 1989, table 13). 
4. Like most developing countries, Taiwan applies restrictions on the ownership, size, foreign 
exchange transactions, scope of operation, etc. Cf. Peat, Manvick, Mitchell and Co. (1987). 
5. For an analysis of industrial and trade policies in Taiwan, see R. Wu (1989). 
6. The highest marginal tax rate on corporate income has been adjusted many times over the 
past three decades. It was 18 percent in 1961-66;  25 percent in 1956-60,  1967-73, and 1986-90; 
30 percent in 1985; and 35 percent in 1974-84. 
7.  A brief review of  the major tax incentives in Taiwan and a comparison with selected other 
countries is presented in tables 12.1 and 12.2. 
8. As regards foreign exchange transactions involving international commodities, the tariff rate 
dropped from 20.1 percent in  1987 to  12.8 percent in  1988. Moreover, a constantly increasing 317  Tax Policy and Foreign Direct Investment in Taiwan 
ment is now permitted in  almost all industries. Domestic shareholding and 
business operations requirements and restrictions on the repatriation of profits 
and capital have also been  greatly reduced. Conspicuously, Taiwan  has at- 
tracted more FDI in recent years, both in absolute and in relative  term^.^ 
Against this background, the current tax policy toward FDI has been under 
critical review. The effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting FDI has been 
an area of  controversy (Riedel  1975; Wu  et al.  1980). A recent study (Tsai 
1991) found that FDI in Taiwan was likely to be determined by  supply-side 
factors, rather than by government policy. The side effects of FDI’s contribu- 
tion to Taiwan’s trade surplus have also called for reconsideration of existing 
policies that were designed largely to cope with the earlier problem of a seri- 
ous exchange shortage (R. Wu  1989). Furthermore, the cost of tax incentives 
in terms of losses in equity and efficiency has brought about a comprehensive 
review of national income taxation (Chen and Cheng 1990). 
The ROC Tax Reform Commission (1987-89)  has proposed a comprehen- 
sive package of income tax reforms that includes the integration of individual 
and business income taxes and the abolishment of  most current tax  incen- 
tives.I0  How FDI in Taiwan will be affected by the proposed tax policy change 
and how important this effect will be should be a subject for serious scrutiny. 
Current empirical results from cross-national studies can make little contri- 
bution to an evaluation of the suggested policy change (Agarwal 1980). 
This paper provides some observations based on empirical studies of  the 
effects of  tax policy on FDI in Taiwan. For that purpose, firm-specific FDI 
data for 1984-86  and also aggregate time-series FDI  data for  1972-87  are 
analyzed. While the data are severely limited, some basic policy implications 
may still be explored. Further investigations should be made to evaluate the 
impact of  abolishing tax  incentives in  those industries where international 
competition to attract investment is severe. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 12.2 reviews some studies of 
the effects of  tax policy on capital inflows in developing countries. Section 
12.3 discusses tax preferences in Taiwan. Section 12.4 analyzes FDI in Tai- 
wan by  industry, sources of origin, and export orientation in order to display 
its changing characteristics. Section 12.5 presents the regression results ob- 
number of imported goods are exempted from Taiwan’s prior-permit requirements, and the range 
of allowable foreign investment, for which favorable status is granted, has been significantly ex- 
tended from the manufacturing to the service industries. 
9.  Approved FDI has increased from U.S.  $395 million (1981) to $2,418 million (1989), and 
its share as a percentage of domestic nonresidential investment increased from 3.56 percent (1981) 
to 8.56 percent (1989); see table  12.3. That table also shows that actual FDI as a percentage of 
FDI in nonoil developing countries increased from 1.03 percent (1981) to 6.03 percent (1987). 
10.  Since the government of Taiwan has taken a piecemeal, approach to tax reform, the extent 
to which reform proposals will be put into effect remains to be seen. According to the draft of a 
new act currently under consideration by the Legislative Yuan,  however, only tax holidays will be 
eliminated entirely, while accelerated depreciation, tax credits, and other incentives will remain. 
For a brief  summary of the proposed changes in Taiwan’s income taxation made by the Tax Re- 
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tained from firm-specific and time-series data to ascertain the relationship be- 
tween FDI and tax policy.  Section  12.6 summarizes  some important results 
found in this study and discusses their policy implications. 
12.2  Review of  Literature 
In theory the tax policy of both host country and home country should have 
a significant impact on international  capital  flow.  Consider this  simple ex- 
ample. A dollar investment in the home country yields the risk-adjusted, net 
rate of return (1 -  t)r  each year, where t and r are the income tax rate and the 
before-tax rate of return, respectively. On the other hand, the investment earns 
(1 - th)rh  in the host country, where subscript h represents the host country. 
If the subsidiary firm repatriates its earnings immediately, how much will the 
parent firm have at its disposal? Apparently,  the answer depends on the tax 
policy on foreign source income that the home country adopts.” 
Since the major sources of FDI in Taiwan are the United States and Japan, 
we will take the “residence approach’ in our analysis where foreign tax credits 
are allowed.’* We  will  also explicitly assume t,, < t.” In this case, the tax 
liability to the home country is (t -  t,) for each dollar that the parent com- 
pany receives,  and total tax payments are (t -  f,,)  + t, = t.  Thus, the net 
rate of  return on foreign  investment  is  (1 - t)r,,,  and the  firm benefits  by 
investing abroad if rh > r . Neither the home country tax nor the host country 
tax  affects  the  firm’s international  investment  decision. This conclusion  is 
consistent  with the previous research in this area, which  argued that taxing 
foreign income at the domestic rate with a credit provides for “capital export 
neutrality.” It follows that any tax concessions offered by the host country will 
result in a transfer of tax revenue to the home country’s government without 
affecting the firm’s investment. 
In the above discussion, we explicitly  assume that the foreign subsidiary 
repatriates earnings immediately. The result may be different if this assump- 
tion is relaxed,  since the tax the home country imposes on the firm’s foreign 
investment is typically deferred until earnings are repatriated. In the most ex- 
treme case, the foreign subsidiary retains all of the earnings, and the effective 
tax rate on foreign income is equal to t,, the host country’s tax. This is the 
basis under which previous studies argued that, under the tax-sum-credit sys- 
11.  This assumes that the host country does not impose a withholding tax on repatriation. 
12.  In the United States and Japan, however, a deduction from taxable income may be  taken in 
lieu of the tax credit. As such, the firm  should invest in  the foreign country if  (1 - th)rh  > r. 
Then it is of interest to see that the home country tax applied to foreign source income, t,  plays no 
role in the firm’s marginal investment decision. Moreover, a tax reduction in the host country can 
potentially encourage capital flow. 
13. The corporate income tax rates for the United States and Japan are currently 34 percent and 
40 percent, respectively, compared with 25 percent in Taiwan. Cf. table 12.2. 319  Tax Policy and Foreign Direct Investment in Taiwan 
tem, the ability to defer taxation on foreign source income confers a tax ad- 
vantage on foreign investment. 
The above view has recently been challenged by Hartman (1984, 1985). He 
correctly draws attention to the distinction between investment financed out 
of earnings abroad and investment financed by transfers from the home coun- 
try.  If  the subsidiary is investing out of retained earnings, the home country 
tax on foreign source income does not affect the marginal investment deci- 
sion. On the other hand, if  the planned investment by  the subsidiary is not 
sufficient to exhaust totally its retained earnings (i.e., if repatriation of earn- 
ings must take place), then the home country tax is unavoidable and its present 
value does not depend on the length of deferral. Thus the decision for invest- 
ment out of retained earnings should depend only on net returns available in 
the home country or the host country. 
Hartman’s argument can easily be illustrated by using the simple example 
cited above.  Suppose that  the subsidiary has  a dollar of  after-tax earnings 
(previously taxed at the host country rate t,), which can be either repatriated 
or reinvested. If the subsidiary firm repatriates the earnings immediately, after 
paying the home country tax the parent has at its disposal (1 -  t)/(  1 -  th) 
dollars. If the dollar is reinvested, the dollar plus the one-period earnings will 
be repatriated at the end of the period. Upon receipt of the dividend, the parent 
must pay the home country tax on the original dollar of earnings and the return 
earned during the period, but it can claim a credit for the taxes paid to the host 
country. So the parent receives (1 -  t)  [  1 + r,  (1 - t,)]/(  1 -  f,).  The pre- 
sent value of this amount is equal to (1 -  t)/(  1 -  t,), when discounted at the 
rate of return, net of the host country tax, [  1 + rh  (1 - t,)]. 
Return to the case where the subsidiary repatriates its profits immediately; 
the dollar is in the form of a dividend to the parent company. After investing 
in the home country at a net rate of return, (1 - t)r,  the parent has (1 -  t) 
[l + r (1 - t)]/(l -  t,) at the end of the period. Comparing these two re- 
sults, we  see that the dollar should be reinvested in the host country rather 
than repatriated if  r,  (1 -  f,)  > r(1 -  t).  Note that this is exactly the result 
obtained when the home country adopts the “territorial approach” to taxation 
of foreign source income. Hartman called this “capital import neutrality,” that 
is, the same tax rates influence the decision of both domestic firms and foreign 
firms in the host country that finance investment through retained earnings. 
The discussions above imply that fiscal incentives offered by  developing 
host countries that lower the value of  t, will  in most cases be effective in 
attracting FDI. How responsive FDI is to these tax concessions is of course an 
empirical question. There is no clear-cut conclusion about the effectiveness of 
these measures in attracting FDI. Most empirical evidence suggests that their 
overall impact on FDI is marginal at best (Root and Ahmed 1978, Shah and 
Toye 1978, Lim 1983, Goldsbrough 1985, Balasubramanyam 1986). 
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tax measures in attracting FDI to a host of disincentives that generally accom- 
pany the incentives provided by a host country. These include restrictions on 
ownership, size, location, dividends, royalties, fees, entry into certain indus- 
tries and mandatory provisions for local purchases, as well as the requirement 
of  being  export-oriented.  Moreover,  the  incentive  policies  of  developing 
countries are generally quite restrictive in the sense that foreign investors must 
fulfill a number of conditions to be eligible for them. For example, in Taiwan 
the Investment  Commission  of  the  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs has been 
known to manipulate its power to regulate the inflow of capital (R. Wu 1989). 
Many  authors  have  also pointed  out that  tax  incentives are so pervasive 
among developing nations that the benefits these measures confer on a country 
are very small (for example, Root and Ahmed 1978). However, Goldsbrough 
(1985) postulated that an individual country might lose much new investment 
were it to lower or abolish all its incentives unilaterally. This issue is particu- 
larly relevant for newly industrialized economies that wish to attract capital 
inflow on  the  one hand,  while  reducing  unnecessary  tax  incentives on the 
other hand. 
From the point of view of a host country, it is even more important to iden- 
tify the demand-side determinants that it can control to some extent. For that 
purpose, case studies rather than cross-national analyses would be more rele- 
vant. In the case of Taiwan, Wu et al. (1980) found in their survey that most 
U.S. firms are concerned with tax concessions. Riedel(1975) concluded from 
his econometric results that the incentives in Taiwan have no impact on U.S. 
FDI, though  they  are effective  in  attracting  capital  inflow from Japan  and 
Hong Kong. However, Tsai’s recent study (1991) found that neither govern- 
ment  incentive measures  nor Taiwan’s extraordinary  economic performance 
were themselves  significant factors in  attracting FDI. Therefore, it is likely 
that FDI in Taiwan is determined by supply-side factors. 
Since the variety and complexity of incentives make it difficult to evaluate 
their effectiveness, one would need more relevant data and a better methodol- 
ogy to ascertain clearly the relationship between FDI and tax policy. It is ex- 
actly in these areas that the present paper hopes to make a contribution to the 
existing literature. 
12.3  Tax Preferences 
There are two methods by which foreign investors may fulfill the require- 
ments for capital investment  in Taiwan. One requires approval by the ROC 
Investment  Commission  pursuant  to  the  Statute for Investment by  Foreign 
Nationals or the Statute for Investment by Overseas Chinese. The other is to 
set up branches or subsidiaries without foreign investment approval if the firm 
meets the requirements  of minimal capital contribution, a resident manager, 
domiciled national stockholders and shareholdings,  and a domiciled national 
chairman and supervisors.  In either case, foreign firms and their local coun- 321  Tax Policy and Foreign Direct Investment in Taiwan 
terparts are treated equally.I4 In this section, we will discuss the tax prefer- 
ences that have been enjoyed both by FDI and domestic investment over the 
past three decades. 
Almost all of Taiwan’s major tax incentives are provided through the Statute 
for Encouragement of Investment, which was originally promulgated in Sep- 
tember  1960. This statute was initially supposed to be effective for only ten 
years; however, it has been extended and expanded for two decades. Current 
major tax incentives and their history are compiled and shown in table 12.1. 
Four types of businesses are identified,  according to the tax preferences for 
which they qualify: general profit-seeking enterprises, general productive en- 
terprises, important productive  enterprises, and  firms  eligible for tax  holi- 
days.Is 
Four major measures were gradually introduced during the past three dec- 
ades: tax holidays and tax ceilings in the  1960s, accelerated depreciation in 
the late  1960s and 1970s, and more-specific depreciation  measures and tax 
credits in the  1980s. With few exceptions, the provisions for tax preferences 
became more and more generous over time; the whole incentive system is now 
very complex. For example, an important productive enterprise may claim ten 
tax preferences that are listed in table 12.1. Some of them may be redundant 
(for example, tax ceilings), while some have multiple benefits (for example, 
tax credits and accelerated depreciation). 
Table  12.2 compares tax and incentive systems among Taiwan,  its major 
FDI sources, i.e., the United States and Japan, and its major FDI competitors, 
such as Korea, Singapore, and Thailand. Clearly, Taiwan currently  has the 
lowest corporate income tax rate among these countries. Furthermore, Taiwan 
also provides the most generous incentives (except for tax holidays). Not only 
are tax credits and depreciation  preferences  provided  for general capital in- 
vestment  rather  than  for specific  industries  or purposes, but  the  degree  to 
which both preference items are enjoyed by firms in Taiwan is quite large. It 
is clear that the incentive measures have actually reduced the tax burden of 
firms in Taiwan. 
To give an idea of  the extent of tax preferences for FDI, table 12.3  com- 
pares the average effective tax rates for foreign and domestic manufacturing 
firms in  1984-86.  It should be noted that the highest marginal business in- 
come tax rate decreased annually during this period from 35 percent in  1984 
to  30 percent  in  1985 and 25 percent  in  1986. The average rate on profit- 
seeking enterprises nationwide was 21.19 percent over the same period (Lee 
and Chu  1990). Table  12.3 indicates that foreign firms,  as a whole, bore a 
14.  However, it should be noted that nontax favorable treatment is provided to foreign invest- 
ment with approval. For example, the restrictions on the percentages of  foreign ownership and 
stockholders and on the chairman and supervisors may be waived. Moreover, there is a twenty- 
year guarantee against government expropriation or forced requisition. Cf. Peat, Marwick, Mitch- 
ell and Co.  (1987). 
15. For the definitions of the different types of  firms, see the notes to table 12.1. 322  Ching-huei Chang and Peter W.  H. Cheng 
Table 12.1  Major Tax Incentives for Firms in Taiwan 
Type of  Firm  Tax Incentive 




prisesa  2-year depreciation for pollution- 
control facilities 
saving facilities 
in major high-tech enterprises 
in venture capital projects 
2-year depreciation for energy- 
30% tax credit for capital investment 





Firms eligible for 
tax holidaysd 
Tax ceiling 
Accelerated depreciation for 
renovation of machinery and 
equipment 
Accelerated depreciation for R&D 
facilities 
5-20%  tax credit for machinery and 
equipment 
20% tax credit for R&D expenses 
All preferences enjoyed by profit- 
seeking enterprises 
Tax ceiling 
All preferences enjoyed by general 
productive enterprises 
5-year exemption for new firms 
4-year exemption for expansion 
May elect to adopt accelerated 
May elect to defer commencement 
firms 
depreciation 





1960 (IS%), 1971 (25%). 
1987 (20% for large trade 
and venture capital) 




1960 (IS%), 1971 (22%), 
1988 (20%) 
1960 
1960 (5 yrs), 1971 (4 yrs) 
1971 
1977 (1-4 yn). 1982 (24  yrs) 
Source: Study on Tax Incentive Measures  in the Statute for Encouragement of Investment (in Chinese), 
ROC Tax Reform Commission Technical Report no. 37 (Ministry of Finance, June 1989). 
‘Any public or private organization that engages in activities for profit-seeking purposes, organized in 
any form. 
bA firm that is organized as a “company limited by  shares” and operates in a set of specified industries 
including manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and most other industries except major service sectors. 
cA firm in the metal, heavy machinery, or petrochemical industry that is capital-intensive and technology- 
intensive and “confirms the need for development of economic and national defense industries.” 
dA productive enterprise that conforms to regulated categories and criteria of encouragement and is newly 
established or effects an expanion of equipment through an increase of capital. Table 12.2 
Taxes and Incentives  Japan  Korea  Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand  United States 
Comparison of Taxes and Incentives on Corporate Income, 1989 
Highest marginal cor-  40% 
porate tax rates 
on dividend income' 
Withholding tax rate  20% 
Tax holidays  Nil 
Other major incentives  Up to 7% tax credit 




20% tax credit for 
incremental 
R&D. 
27, 30, or 33% 
25% 
Up to 5 years for FDI 
only 
30% special depreciation 
for exports. 
Up to  10% tax credit or 





Flat 32%  25% 
32% to be paid out 
of  corporate tax 
20%b 
Up to 10 years  Up to 5 years 
Reduced rate, up to  Up to 20% tax credit. 
Up to 2-year  5 years for 
international  depreciation. 
trade and 
services. 
Up to 50% 
investment 
allowances. 
Flat 30 or 35%  34% 
20%  30% 
Up to 8 years  Nil 
-  20% tax credit for 
incremental 
R&D 
Sources: Corporate Taxes: A Worldwide Summary,  1988  (New York: Price Waterhouse); 1988 International Tax Summaries (New York: Coopers and Lybrand); 
Asian Pacijc Taxution, 1989 (Tokyo: KPMG Peat Marwick). 
'Rates  may be reduced in accordance with the provisions in the double taxation agreements. 
bThirty-five  percent is levied on nonapproved investment. However, these foreign investors may elect to file an income final return subject to progressive tax rates, 
in which case the effective tax rate may be lower than 20 percent. Table 12.3  Comparison of Effective Tax Rates for Foreign and Domestic Manufacturing Firms in Taiwan, 1984-86  Average (%) 
All Domestic and 
Foreign 
Firms with Tax Holiday  Foreign Firms with Tax Holiday  All Foreign Firms 
Sample  Before Tax  Tax Holiday  Other Tax  After All  Average  Sample  After All 
Industry  Size  Concessions  Benefit  Benefit  Concessions  Number  Tax Rate  Size  Concessions 
















































































Sources: Effective tax rates for all domestic and foreign firms with tax holidays in Taiwan are calculated from the corporate income tax returns of the sampled data 
in Lee and Chu (1990). Effective tax rates and tax concessions for foreign firms with tax holidays are calculated from the subfile data used by Lee and Chu (1990). 
Effective tax  rates for all foreign firms in Taiwan are calculated from the data in An Analysis  of  Operations  and Economic Effecrs of  Foreign Enterprises  (in 
Chinese) (ROC, Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1987). 
the highest marginal tax rates were 35 percent (1984). 30 percent (l985), and 25 percent (1986). the exceptionally high average effective tax rate for food 
and beverage processing was due to the aggregation of positive profits of  some firms with the large losses of other firms. 
bWeighted  average of the sample size or number of firms in each industry. 325  Tax Policy and Foreign Direct Investment in Taiwan 
lower tax burden (19.47 percent) than the national average. It further shows 
that the effective tax rate for the foreign firms eligible for tax  holidays and 
other incentives was  11.26 percent, only about one-half of the national aver- 
age effective tax rate (21.29 percent), and about 2 percentage points lower 
than the average effective tax rate for all domestic and foreign firms eligible 
for tax holidays ( 13.3  1 percent). 
However, to measure the extent of tax preferences more meaningfully, one 
should compare the after-tax concession rate (1 1.26 percent) with the before- 
tax  concession rate (17.46 percent). This gives about a one-third, or 6.20 
percent, tax savings to foreign firms eligible for tax holidays. This tax savings 
can be further decomposed into two parts: 5.11 percent for tax holidays, and 
1.09 percent for other tax preferences, major tax credits, and tax ceilings.16 
12.4  Changing Characteristics of FDI in Taiwan 
12.4.1  FDI Trends 
Summary data for the amount of  approved and actual FDI in Taiwan are 
presented in table 12.4. Though approved investment figures vary  annually, 
they were generally less than U.S. $1 billion before 1987, and clearly exhib- 
ited a pattern of  gradual increase. In relative terms, however, approved FDI 
displayed a large swing during 1952-89.  FDI was an important supplement 
to inadequate domestic savings in the 1960s and early 1970s. It accounted for 
12.5 percent of nonresidential domestic investment in  1970. The importance 
of  approved FDI has declined since then; however, it swung back  to over 5 
percent after  1984. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Taiwan  has had a 
large amount of  excess savings in  recent years, totaling over 9 percent of 
GNP.” Table 12.4 also reveals that about one-third of  annual approved FDI 
went into the expansion of old projects, while two-thirds went for new proj- 
ects. 
The annual data on the actual amount of  FDI show the same increasing 
pattern as for approved FDI.18 Before  1986, the ratio of  actual to approved 
FDI remained relatively constant at about 40 percent. In the last two years, 
however, the realization ratio of approved FDI has been high: 8 1.07 percent 
in 1988 and 66.34 percent in 1989. The major reason for the large discrepancy 
between actual and approved FDI remains unknown, and future trends deserve 
16.  Since accelerated depreciation has been  included as an expense in calculating before-tax 
profit, its degree of tax preference cannot be identified. In other words, the tax preferences en- 
joyed by foreign firms, such as tax holidays (as shown in table 12.3). are underestimated because 
of the exclusion of accelerated depreciation. 
17.  The percentages  are  11.88 (1984),  14.83 (1985), 21.34 (1986), 18.39 (1987).  11.68 
(1988). and 9.32 (1989). See Quarterly Narional Economic Trends, Directorate-General of Bud- 
get, Accounting Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC, February 1990. 
18.  Both the approved and actual amounts of FDI in the Taiwanese data include equity invest- 
ment and reinvested earnings, but the data do not include loans from parent firms to subsidiaries. 
Also. it should be noted that these two FDI statistics are obtained from different sources. 326  Ching-huei Chang and Peter W.  H. Cheng 
Table 12.4  %ends in Taiwan's  Foreign Direct Investment 
Approved FDI  Actual FDI 
Amount  Percentage  Percentage  Amount  Percentage  Percentage of 
(millions  of  Expansion  Nonresidential  (millions  of Approved  FDI in Nonoil 
Year  of U.S. $)  Projects  Investmenta  of  U.S. $)  FDI  LDCS 
1952  1.067  -  2.43  -  -  - 
I960  15.470  -  6.93  5.77  37.30  - 
1970  138.900  44.05  12.50  61.93  44.59  4.80 
1980  466.000  36.93  4.28  165.70  35.56  I .47 
1981  395.800  42.50  3.56  150.90  38.13  1.03 
1982  380.000  29.21  3.60  104.00  27.37  0.80 
1983  404.500  38.51  3.98  149.00  36.84  1.48 
I984  558.700  38.97  5.29  200.90  35.96  1.91 
1985  702.500  30.72  7.32  340.20  48.43  3.06 
1986  770.400  29.52  6.25  326.00  42.34  3.44 
1987  1,419.MH)  35.30  7.75  715.00  50.39  6.03 
1988  1,183.000  43.83  5.49  959.00  81.07  - 
1989  2,418.000  32.87  8.51  1,604.00  66.34  - 
Totali 
average  10,950.0OOb  36.95d  5.99c  -  45.35'  2.67 
Sources: For approved FDI, Statistics on Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investment (Taipei: ROC In- 
vestment Commission, Ministry of  Economic Affairs, various years). For actual FDI, Balance of  Pay- 
ments Statistics (Taiwan: Central Bank of  China, 1989). For FDI in non-oil-exporting LDCs, Balance of 
Payments Staristics Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, various years). For non- 
residential domestic investment,  Quarterly National Economic  Trends Directorate-General of  Budget, 
Accounting Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC, Taipei February  1990. 
Gross fixed capital formation, excluding residential buildings 
bTotal for the period from  1952 to 1989. 
Simple average for the selected years shown in the table 
to be followed closely.I9  The other important figure in table 12.4 is the share 
of Taiwan's FDI in total FDI of all non-oil-exporting LDCs. Tsai (1991) men- 
tioned that the ratio remained quite stable during 1958-85.  However, table 
12.4 clearly shows that Taiwan has attracted an increasing share of  the total 
FDI since 1982. Therefore, the demand-side determinants of  FDI in Taiwan 
in recent years deserve further scrutiny. 
12.4.2  Composition of FDI 
Three aspects of the changing composition of FDI in Taiwan are presented 
in tables 12.5 and 12.6. From panel A of table 12.5, it can be seen that the 
dominant  sector of  FDI  has  been  manufacturing.  However,  its  share has 
dropped from 77.58 percent in the 1960s to 68.01 percent in  1985-89.  The 
largest decline has been in the electronic and electrical appliance sector, which 
went from 36.61 percent of  all FDI in  the 1960s down to 21.21 percent in 
19. Though the time lag for realizing investment may be part of the cause of the discrepancy, 
it cannot account for the size of the gap between approved and actual FDI. See Schive (1987). Table 12.5  Composition of Foreign Direct Investment in Taiwan, 1960-89  (in millions of U.S.  dollars) 
1960-69  1970-79  1980-84  1985-89 
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1.895.00  100.00 
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137.00  7.23 
457.00  24.12 
335.00  18.73 
187.00  9.87 
B. By area 
624.00  32.93 
342.00  18.05 
147.00  7.76 
556.00  29.34 

















































Source: Sratisrics on  Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investment (Taipei: ROC Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs,  1989). 
'Including United Kingdom, West Germany, France, The Netherlands, and Switzerland. 
bAll Asian countries except Japan. 
The sharp increase is due to FDI from tax havens. It is calculated by the Investment Commission that FDI  from tax havens in 1989 was U.S.  564% $ million, 
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Table 12.6  Export Ratios of Foreign Firms in Taiwan, 1978-87  (%) 
1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987 
Total  60  54  53  54  55  51  52  49  46  47 
Electronics  70  66  67  71  71  80  77  80  72  75 
Chemicals  51  43  44  41  39  31  25  26  20  22 
Machinery  31  25  28  34  48  20  30  18  33  19 
Other manufacturing  59  57  52  52  50  52  48  51  38  47 
Services  28  19  17  16  19  20  17  14  9  7 
Others  76  78  69  67  80  79  77  71  74  80 
Source: An  Analysis  of  Operations and Economic Effects of Foreign Enterprises  (in Chinese) 
(Taipei: ROC Investment Commission, Ministry of  Economic Affairs, 1987). 
1985-89.  In contrast, there was a sharp rise in the share going to services, 
from 16.60 percent in  1980-84  to 29.19 percent in 1985-89.  The change in 
the service industry  is quite conspicuous, reflecting that Taiwan’s domestic 
service markets have begun to open up to foreign competition.20 
Panel B of table 12.5 also shows that the sources of FDI have substantially 
changed during the past three decades. The share of U.S. investment has de- 
clined from 42.43 percent  in  the  1960s to 22.74 percent in  1985-89.  The 
United States’ dominant role  was taken  over by Japanese investors whose 
share has increased from 16.50 percent to 29.99 percent in the same period. 
In the last five years, investment from the major European countries has also 
increased from 7.57 percent to 12.75 percent. However, the most conspicuous 
increase in recent years has been in investment from so-called tax haven coun- 
tries or areas. It was estimated by the Investment Commission that as much as 
U.S. $564 million of  FDI  in  1989 came from such places, accounting for 
23.33 percent of total FDI in  that year. These investments are suspected to 
have been made by Taiwan residents so as to avoid Taiwan’s highly progres- 
sive personal income tax rates.2L  This issue has prompted suggestions that the 
international and domestic aspects of  income taxation should be regarded as 
an integrated rather than a separate system. 
One of the major effects of FDI in Taiwan has been export expansion. Many 
believe that, in the past, foreign investors came mainly to take advantage of 
cheap labor in Taiwan and to produce for international markets where they had 
a comparative advantage.  A survey by  the Investment Commission revealed 
20.  It is also recognized that the openness of  the service sector is one of the major topics that 
will be discussed during the upcoming Taiwan-U.S. trade negotiation sessions. Cf. The Analysis 
of FDI  in  1989, prepared by the ROC Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
1990. 
21.  Tax havens are defined to include those countries without an income taxation system, those 
applying very low income tax rates, or those that exempt the foreign source income of their resi- 
dents. Ironically, Taiwan still takes the territorial approach toward its residents’ foreign source 
income and thus should be classified as a tax haven by the Investment Commission. For a review 
of the current international income taxation system in Taiwan, see Chen and Cheng (1990). 329  Tax Policy and Foreign Direct Investment in Taiwan 
that direct and indirect exports made by foreign firms in Taiwan accounted for 
29.06 percent of total national exports in 1978. This ratio declined to 17 per- 
cent in  1987.22  Two factors contributed to the changes in the importance of 
FDI  in national exports. One reflects the shift in the industrial structure of 
FDI. Specifically, electronics became the single most important export indus- 
try in Taiwan, with export values accounting for two-thirds to three-quarters 
of the total exports made by foreign firms in 1978-87.  As shown in panel A 
of  table 12.5, however, the electronics industry’s share of total FDI has stead- 
ily declined over the last three decades. In  contrast, other more domestic- 
oriented manufacturing industries such  as  chemicals and  machinery  have 
gained a greater share of total FDI. Needless to say, the increasing amount of 
FDI in the service sector is mainly geared toward the domestic market. 
The second factor that may have contributed to the relative decline in the 
export share of foreign firms is the shift in the market orientation of each FDI 
industry. Table 12.6 exhibits the export ratio of foreign firms in Taiwan during 
1978-87.  Two  different  market  tendencies can  be  observed.  For  export- 
oriented industries, mainly electronics and the “other” category, export ratios 
slightly increased over  1978-87.  For domestic-oriented industries, such as 
chemicals, machinery, and services, a decline in export ratios during the dec- 
ade is rather clear. 
In summary, Taiwan’s FDI has increased substantially in both absolute and 
relative terms during the  1980s, and structurally its focus has begun to turn 
more toward domestic markets. Since a foreign investor may have many lo- 
cations to choose from in deciding where to produce for international markets, 
it makes sense to distinguish between export- and domestic-oriented FDI in 
order to evaluate the potential impact of tax incentives on the inducement of 
both  kinds of  FDI.  It is also reasonable to conjecture that FDI  in export- 
oriented industries, such as electronics, would be more likely to respond to 
tax incentives. In the following section we will present the regressional results 
of our analysis on total FDI in Taiwan, FDI in manufacturing, and FDI in the 
electronics industry. 
12.5  Effects of Tax  Incentives on FDI in Taiwan 
Econometric attempts to ascertain the effects of tax policy on FDI have been 
unsuccessful for both theoretical and statistical reasons. Tax incentives in Tai- 
wan, as shown in table 12. l,  are so pervasive that they cannot be represented 
well by the dummy variable proxy commonly used in empirical studies. Our 
study tries to overcome this difficulty by measuring the extent of  tax prefer- 
ences that FDI has enjoyed. Two regressional analyses are made, one using 
time-series data and the other using firm-specific data. 
22. An Analysis  of  Operations and  Economic  Effecrs  of  Foreign  Enterprises  (in Chinese) 
(Taipei: ROC Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1987). 330  Ching-huei Chang and Peter W.  H. Cheng 
12.5.1  Time-Series Studies 
According to Riedel (1979, Wu et al. (1980),  and Tsai (1991), the poten- 
tial demand-side determinants of FDI in Taiwan include the domestic market, 
incentive policies, and cheap cost.  Since we are interested  in explaining in- 
creasing FDI in Taiwan during the  1980s, we will use data from 1972-87.23 
However, the cost of labor in Taiwan during this period was not what could be 
called cheap. After having adjusted for the effects of foreign exchange rates, 
the increase in the unit labor cost in Taiwan reached  13 percent over 1970- 
82, which was higher than labor cost increases in the United  States, Japan, 
Korea, and Singapore (Tsai 1991). Hence, in this study, we try to test for the 
adverse impact of rising labor costs on the inflow of  FDI. Since strong export 
orientation is one characteristic of FDI in Taiwan, it is considered explicitly in 
the model. 
The estimated regression equation is specified as follows:24 
(1)  FDI = b, + b,  GNP + b,  Export + b,  Wage + b, Tax Pref, 
where FDI = approved FDI in Taiwan in a given year, GNP = gross national 
product in a given year, Export = the ratio of foreign firms’ exports to total 
national exports in a given year,  Wage  = wage index, and Tax  Pref  = tax 
preferences enjoyed by foreign firms in a given year, measured by the differ- 
ence between the highest marginal corporate income tax rate and the average 
effective tax rate. 
This equation is applied to the inflow of total FDI in Taiwan and disaggre- 
gate FDI, such as FDI from Japan and the United States, and FDI in the elec- 
tronics  industry.  All  coefficients  except  b, are expected  to be positive.  To 
eliminate supply-side effects, relative FDI, expressed as Taiwan’s share of  to- 
tal FDI in non-oil-exporting LDCs, is also estimated using equation (1). 
Table  12.7 gives  the results of  the estimation  and provides comparisons 
with the results of a previous study (Tsai 1991). Three major findings can be 
summarized: 
1. In terms of goodness-of-fit, as measured by the adjusted R2,  all equations, 
except FDI from the United States, perform very well. 
2.  In terms of  testing hypotheses, the results consistently show that GDP has 
a positive effect, while rising labor costs have a negative effect; the other 
two variables, export orientation and tax preferences,  have no significant 
effect. 
3. Contrary  to Tsai  (1991), this  study  finds that  Taiwan has attracted rela- 
tively more FDI than other non-oil-exporting  LDCs. This may be due to 
the policy change that opened Taiwan’s domestic  markets,  witnessed by 
23.  One of the other major reasons for using this time period is that more detailed data on tax 
preferences were made available beginning in 1972. 
24.  Other variables such as the growth rate of GDP, the political climate, and the status of the 
public infrastructure are also considered. However, no significant effects have been shown to be 
related to these variables. Table 12.7  Comparison of Tsme-Series Regression Results for Foreign Direct Investment in Taiwan 
Approved FDI (1972-87)  Actual FDI (1958-85) 
Independent  FDI in Nonoil  FDI from  FDI  in  FDI  in Nonoil LDCs, 
Variable  FDI  LDCs (%)  FDl from Japan  U.S.  Electronics  FDI  1965-85  (%) 
Intercept  -355,871  7.9873  -76.2681  -  6.0743  -  244.66  0.2447  -0.0239 
( -  1.095)  (2.3816)  (-0.590)  (-0.025)  (-1.616)  (0.385)  (-0.083) 
GDP  1.6038  o.ooo02  0.0005  0.0003  0.0005  (RF'CDGP) 0.2448 
(5.423)**  (4.958)**  (4.142)**  (1.374)  (3.276)**  (0.763) 
AGDP  0.3313  (RAGDP) -0.0331 
(2.783)*  (-0.153) 
Export ratio  14,901  -0.1390  2.6505  0.9023  8.1398 
(1.409)  (- 1.274)  (.06299)  (0.114)  (1.708) 
Dummy for export  -0.5953  0.7716 
orientation  (- 2.646)*  (2.531)* 
Wage index  -24,847  -0.2856  -7.5687  -4.0810  -7.5706 
Dummy for export  1.3162 
(-4.523)**  (-5.037)**  (-3.463)**  (-0.994)  (-2.686)* 
processing  (3.739)** 
zones 
Tax preferences  4,871  0.1002  1.3916  0.6769  3.6975 
(0.867)  (1.729)  (0.6228)  (0.161)  (1.156) 
Dummy for tax  0.3769 
preferences  (1.06) 
Adjusted R2  0.9033  0.8301  0.8594  0.5543  0.7645  0.85  0.20 
Durbin-Watson  2.5396  2.5018  1.6656  2.6139  2.1260  1.54  1.95 
N  16  16  16  16  16  28  20 
Sources: Computational assistance for this study was provided by Hui-hse Chen. Actual FDI from Tsai (1991). 
Nores: The numbers in parentheses are r-statistics; * and ** indicate results significantly different from zero at either the 5 percent or 1 percent levels, respectively. 
RPCGDP = (RCGDP/PCGDPW).lW, where PCGDP is per  capita GDP in Taiwan and PCGDPW is the average of per  capita GDP in all non-oil-exporting LDCs. 
RAGDP = (AGDP/AGDPW).IW, where AGDP is annual change of GDP in Taiwan and AGDPW is the average of annual change of GDP in all non-oil-exporting 
LDCS. 
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the increasing share of FDI going to domestic-oriented investment, partic- 
ularly  the service sector, as shown in table  12.5. However, both  studies 
agree that the effect of tax preferences on FDI is insignificant. 
12.5.2  Cross-sectional Studies 
The data for the cross-sectional studies come from the financial statements 
of  fifty-six foreign manufacturing firms that were eligible for tax holidays and 
reported their corporate income in  1984-86.25 The dependent variable is the 
increase in net worth, which reflects both equity investment and reinvested 
earnings. The independent  variables include the year of  establishment,  the 
before-tax profit rate, and tax preferences. Since the before-tax profit rate can 
be accounted  for by  a firm’s characteristics,  the following equation  is esti- 
mated: 
(2)  ANet worth  = c, + c,Y + c,ks  + c,g  + c,A  + c,T,  + C,T,, 
where ANet worth = the average of the increases in net worth of a given firm 
during  1984-85  and  1985-86;  Y  = the year of establishment;  ks = capital 
structure, measured  by  the average of  liabilities divided by  total assets of a 
given firm in  1984 and  1985; g  = growth rate of  a firm, measured by the 
average of  the increases in sales divided by the total sales of a given firm in 
1984 and 1985; A  = size of a firm, measured by the average of total assets of 
a given firm in  1984 and  1985; T,  = the average of tax holiday benefits di- 
vided by before-tax profits of a given firm in 1984 and 1985; and, T, = the 
average of  other tax preferences divided by before-tax profits of a given firm 
in 1984 and 1985. 
All  cS except c, and c2  are expected to be positive.  Equation (2) is esti- 
mated for the manufacturing sector and for the electronics industry only. 
The regression  results,  as presented in table  12.8, can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. The effect of  the year of  establishment is mixed.  In each equation, one 
of the alternative factors of the before-tax profit rate has the expected sign and 
is significant. 
2. The effects of tax policy are also mixed. In the manufacturing equations, 
neither a tax holiday nor any of the other tax preferences is significant. How- 
ever, for the electronics  industry, we find that tax holidays have a significant 
effect. The corresponding elasticity of the increase in net worth with respect 
to tax holidays, calculated at mean values, is approximately 0.42. This seems 
to imply that the abolition of tax holidays would lead to a 42 percent cut in the 
increase of  the  net  worth  of  the  electronics  industry.  The marginal impact 
would  be very  strong. The overall  adverse effect  is not so great, however, 
25. These data are confidential for tax purposes and are supposed to be more reliable than those 
obtained from surveys. The data source for this study is thesubfile of data used by Lee and Chu 
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Table 12.8  Cross-sectional Regression Results of Foreign Manufacturing Firms 
in Taiwan, 1985-86  (in millions of N.T. dollars) 
Independent Variable 
Intercept 
Year of establishment 
Liability/total assets 
Increase in saleslsales 
Total assets 
Tax holiday preferences 




in Net Worth 
-490,680(-0.54) 
-  13,081 (- 1.71)* 








in Net Worth 






-  323,890 (- 1.79)* 
20.41 
31 
Source: Computational assistance for this study was provided by  Yon-chin Tsen. Data are from 
Lee and Chu (1990). 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics; * and ** indicate results significantly different 
from zero for one-tailed tests at the 5 percent and  1 percent significance levels, respectively. All 
these firms were eligible for either five-year or four-year tax holidays during 1985-86. 
since it accounts for only 6.7 percent of total net worth.26  The adverse effect 
is also exaggerated in the sense that a firm not receiving a tax holiday can still 
enjoy the other tax preferences  shown in table 12.1. Obviously, it is impos- 
sible for this  study  to project  the whole potential  impact of  abolishing  tax 
holidays  on FDI  in  Taiwan,  since the  effects  of  tax  incentives  on  other 
domestic-oriented  industries would be much smaller, and the electronics in- 
dustry’s share of total FDI has decreased substantially in recent years. 
The methodological  inadequacy  of  this  study is quite clear. No  sophisti- 
cated theoretical model has been developed. D. Wu (1989) used a neoclassical 
model to study the determination of Japanese direct investment in Taiwan for 
the period  1970-84.  However,  a lag structure was not incorporated into the 
model due to data limitations. 
Tsai (1991) pointed out that, to determine whether the demand-side deter- 
minants in Taiwan were relatively more important than those in other coun- 
tries, all variables should be expressed in relative terms. Given the difficulty 
of estimating  labor costs and tax preferences  in various  countries,  a cross- 
national comparison is hardly feasible.  Therefore,  the findings of this study, 
using only the data of Taiwan, are at best tentative. However, these findings 
may be qualitatively valid if the twin trends of rising labor costs and increas- 
ing tax preferences in Taiwan continue. 
In spite of these qualifications,  the overall regression results seem to con- 
firm the changing characteristics  of FDI in Taiwan in recent years. As men- 
tioned in section  12.4, the structure of Taiwan’s FDI has become more ori- 
26.  This is calculated by multiplying 0.42 by 0.1588 (increase in net worthitotal net worth). 334  Ching-huei Chang and Peter W.  H. Cheng 
ented to the  domestic  market,  and  it  is  expected  that  the  effects  of  tax 
incentives are going to be less important than in the past. This conjecture is 
supported by the regression results of the time-series studies and by the firm- 
specific study on total manufacturing FDI in Taiwan. At the same time, high 
export-oriented investors have more countries to choose from nowadays, and 
they can expect to gain more from the provision of tax incentives. This is also 
confirmed by findings that tax holidays have a significant effect on increases 
in net worth in the electronics industry. 
One important policy implication that may be derived from these findings 
can be related to income tax reform in Taiwan. As mentioned before, Taiwan 
currently has a relatively low corporate income tax, while it provides generous 
tax incentives. The questionable effectiveness of tax incentives and their costs 
in terms of equity and efficiency have raised growing doubts about their use- 
fulness. The reforms proposed  by the Tax  Reform  Commission  (Chen and 
Cheng  1990) would  broaden  both  the individual  and  business  income  tax 
bases, lower the income brackets for individual income tax, and reduce the 
highest marginal tax rate from 50 percent to 40 percent. Meanwhile, the busi- 
ness income tax rate would be raised from a marginal 25 percent to a flat rate 
of 35 percent, and complete dividend relief would be allowed for distributed 
profits.27 
Under this reform package, current tax holidays and most of the other major 
incentives would be abolished. Therefore the effective tax rate for FDI in Tai- 
wan would increase from 11.26 percent or 19.47 percent (table  12.2) to 35 
percent or 48 percent, depending on whether the withholding tax on repatri- 
ated profits is paid out of business income tax. If the tentative results of this 
study are reliable, they imply that some highly export-oriented FDI would be 
heavily  affected,  while  the  overall impact  on total  FDI might  be less sub- 
stantial.  This policy  change, however,  would  improve the neutrality  of  re- 
source allocation and meet the need for a more internationalized and liberalized 
economy. 
12.6  Summary and Implications 
This paper provides  some observations taken from empirical  studies and 
examines the possible effects of a change in tax policy on FDI in Taiwan. In 
theory, the fiscal incentives offered by a developing host country, which lower 
its effective tax rate, will in most cases be effective in attracting FDI. How 
responsively FDI reacts to these tax concessions, however, is a priori unclear. 
In the case of Taiwan, we observe that the island increasingly attracted FDI 
during  the  1980s, both  in  absolute  and  in  relative terms. Meanwhile, the 
27.  In Taiwan all profit-seeking enterprises, including proprietorships and partnerships as well 
as corporations, are subject to a business income tax. In making comparisons with other countries, 
however, we have used the term “corporate income tax” as the equivalent of  Taiwan’s “business 
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structure of FDI has moved  towards the service sector and other domestic- 
oriented industries. 
Current tax incentives in Taiwan are very generous: eligible firms may, on 
average,  enjoy  approximately  a one-third tax  savings.  On the basis of  new 
data, the time-series regression for the period 1972-87  reveals that GDP has 
a positive effect on FDI, while rising labor costs have a negative effect. The 
effect of tax preferences  is found to be insignificant, however, as was shown 
in previous studies. 
The  findings  from  firm-specific  data  are mixed.  For  all  manufacturing 
firms, it is found that tax preferences have no significant effect on increases in 
net worth. On the other hand, tax holidays were found to have a significant 
effect on increases in net worth in the electronics industry. The marginal im- 
pact  of  abolishing  tax  holidays on investment  in the electronics industry is 
predicted to be substantial, perhaps causing as much as a 42 percent reduc- 
tion.  However,  the  adverse  impact  is overestimated  in the sense that  other 
incentives may cushion or make up for part of the impact. The overall adverse 
impact on total FDI is also expected to be considerably less because of differ- 
ences in  the  market orientation  of  industries  and the electronics  industry’s 
decreasing share of total FDI. 
While the limited supply of data is a severe problem, two basic policy im- 
plications  can be derived  from these findings.  First,  to understand whether 
and to what extent foreign capital may be withdrawn from Taiwan in response 
to the  unilateral  abolition  of  tax  incentives,  further studies  should be  per- 
formed focusing on those industries that face severe competition for foreign 
capital.  Second,  since Taiwan’s  domestic and  foreign  investment  is  now 
undergoing structural changes, both industrial and tax policies should be ad- 
justed rapidly, in a coordinated way, by taking into account both domestic and 
international  considerations. As Taiwan’s economy  becomes  more  interna- 
tionalized, the neutrality of resource allocation should be more important than 
before, and thus dependence on tax incentives should be gradually reduced. 
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Comment  Kwang Choi 
Overall, Ching-huei Chang  's  and Peter Cheng 's paper is excellent, providing 
a good summary of theoretical issues in general and the characteristics of for- 
eign direct investment (FDI) in Taiwan. 
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The contribution  of the paper lies in its attempts,  based on new data and 
new models, to ascertain the effects of tax policy on FDI in Taiwan. However, 
the attempts have been only partly successful for both theoretical and statisti- 
cal reasons. Two technical points must be mentioned with regard to the time- 
series econometric testing of relationships between tax incentives and inflow 
of FDI into Taiwan. 
First, I would like to ask whether Chang and Cheng have ever run time- 
series regressions based on time-lag specifications. Since it takes time for cor- 
porate  managers  or owners (particularly  foreigners)  to make  decisions  on 
FDI, one might say that there must be better specifications with regard to the 
time lag. 
Second, one may ask a rather fundamental question about the role that tax 
preferences play in inducing FDI. Ceteris paribus, the decision to invest in the 
home country or a foreign country depends on the relative tax advantage be- 
tween the two. Accordingly, tax preferences enjoyed by foreign firms should 
be measured by the difference between the effective corporate tax rate in the 
host country and the effective corporate rate in the rest of the world, including 
the home country, rather than by the difference between the highest marginal 
corporate income tax rate and the average effective tax rate. 
With regard to the cross-sectional studies based on the financial statements 
from fifty-six foreign manufacturing firms in Taiwan, I cannot clearly see how 
the specifications (equations [2] and [3]) examine the effects of  Taiwanese tax 
policy on inducing FDI. What equations (2) and (3) attempt is to examine the 
effects of  tax preferences on the increase  in net worth (not on FDI) within 
Taiwan (not between countries). 
One important factor that might have exerted strong influences on the in- 
flow of  FDI into Taiwan but has not been mentioned at all is investment by 
overseas  Chinese. It should be interesting to investigate the size of  FDI in 
Taiwan by overseas Chinese and the area in which it is found. 
Finally, I have one minor technical  suggestion for presenting the average 
figure  in the note to table 12.4. How  about  showing a simple average for 
1952-1989, instead of a “simple average for the selected years shown in the 
table .” 
Chang and Cheng should be congratulated on their excellent efforts to elu- 
cidate tax policy and FDI in Taiwan. 
Comment  Toshihiro Ihori 
Ching-huei Chang’s and Peter Cheng’s paper investigates empirically the im- 
pact of tax policy on foreign direct investment (FDI) in Taiwan. Their review 
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of the literature shows that the tax incentives will in most cases be effective in 
attracting FDI. However, section 12.4 shows that the effect of tax preferences 
is actually insignificant. I found the empirical results quite interesting. 
I think that there are three possible reasons why the theoretical conjecture 
is not confirmed by the empirical study. First, the real world may be charac- 
terized by “resident”-based taxation in the tax credit case, so that neither the 
home country tax nor the host country tax affects the firm’s international in- 
vestment decision, theoretically. 
Second, the measurement of  the tax preferences may be inaccurate. I am 
not convinced that the tax preferences can be measured by the difference be- 
tween the highest marginal tax rate and the average effective tax rates. 
Finally, even if the tax incentives are attracting FDI, it might take time or 
require some adjustment costs to make an actual investment. It seems quite 
possible that the short-term effect of  the tax incentives on FDI is small but the 
long-term effect is large. I think that the paper would be improved by  being 
more explicit about the dynamic behavior of  FDI and by  incorporating some 
lag structures into the regression. 